The Economic Value of A Passport: A Model of Citizenship and the Social Dividend in a Global Economy - by Valpy FitzGerald & J A Cuesta-Leiva
QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 1
Working Paper Number 4
The Economic Value of A Passport:
A Model of Citizenship and the Social Dividend in a Global
Economy
Valpy FitzGerald and J A Cuesta-Leiva*
In a world of fully mobile capital and highly immobile labour, citizenship is effectively an
entitlement to the ‘dividend’ arising from the social infrastructure accumulated in a
particular country of birth. The paper opens with the reasons why the passport (ie citizenship)
can in consequence be considered as an economic asset with a value that can in principle be
determined analytically. A simple endogenous growth model is set up which defines the level
and growth of per capita income in a world economy where capital is fully mobile and labour
is fully immobile, and where governments set a rate of taxation such as to achieve the optimal
balance between the stocks of private capital and social infrastructure. The ‘passport value’
is then defined as the difference between national income net of capital charges, wage costs
and taxes when divided equally among the population; and is shown to depend on per capita
income, the rate of growth and the parameters of the production function. A preliminary
estimate of the main variables in the model, and the scale of expenditure on social
infrastructure, for a wide range of countries suggests what the order of magnitude of  the
‘value of a passport’ might be. A brief section on the wider implications of the findings
concludes. 
[draft as of 22. 05.97] 
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Introduction
We live in a world economy where capital can move freely but labour cannot. Moreover, it is
intuitively clear that obtaining the citizenship (ie ‘passport’) of an OECD country endows its
owner with level of economic welfare n income greater than that of the citizenship of a non-
OECD country, whether ‘developing’ or ‘transitional’, even though her labour skills or capital
assets equivalent to those of an OECD citizen. The ‘economic asset’ that citizenship of a
democratic industrialized state represents has a value even if it cannot be freely traded; and in
fact this citizenship acquired through an accident of birth (or bequeathed to one’s children) in
most cases probably represents a significant part of the real wealth of the inhabitants of rich
countries. 
Our purpose in this paper is to define the economic value of a passport as an  asset and to
explore its determinants both analytically and empirically.  The paper has four main sections. In
Section 2, we set out the reasons why the passport (ie citizenship) can be considered as an
economic asset which reflect a ‘social dividend’ on infrastructure provision - that is the
entitlement to income arising from national income on publicly owned factors of production
other than ‘pure’ labour and capital. A simple endogenous growth model is set up in Section 3
which defines the level and growth of per capita income in a world economy where capital is
fully mobile and labour is fully immobile, and where governments set a rate of taxation such as
to achieve the optimal balance between the stocks of private capital and public infrastructure. 
In Section 4 we derive the ‘passport value’ from the annual ‘social dividend’, defined as the
difference between national income net of capital charges and wage costs, net of taxes and
divided equally among the population. This passport value is shown to depend on per capita
income, the growth rate and the parameters of the production function. This is then compared
with the value of a work permit, and with the marginal cost to existing citizens of permitting an
extra immigrant. We attempt in Section 5 to approximate a rough empirical estimate of the size
of the ‘social divided’ and thus the ‘value of a passport’ from two directions: the direct
estimation of the main parameters in the model, and the scale of expenditure on social
infrastructure, for a wide range of countries. Section 6 concludes with a brief discussion of the
wider implications of our findings. QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 3
Citizenship as an economic asset
The emergence of a truly global economy since the end of the Cold War has meant an
unprecedented degree of integration through trade and investment, even though labour is as yet
free to move only within certain OECD countries (particularly the European Union) and
certainly not from the non-OECD economies - whether ‘developing’ or ‘transitional’. The
prevailing official view is that globalization presents a unique opportunity for poor economies
to catch up through trade and investment as long as they adopt the correct policies -
particularly the removal of import barriers and financial liberalization combined with sound
macroeconomic policies based on low government expenditure (IMF, 1997). Although some
risks are recognized and there is clearly a need for international assistance for the poorer
countries (World Bank, 1995), there is every expectation that such integration will lead to a
convergence in living standards and thus in a reduction in the pressure to migrate towards
richer countries. Against this optimistic picture is set a widespread critical view which suggests
that the process of global economic integration may leave a considerable part of humanity
worse off and marginalized from dynamic growth centres and without the support of social
provision, leading to fragile state structures and even greater migratory pressure (UNRISD,
1995). 
The existence of a widespread black market in stolen or forged passports reflects unsatisfied
demand from the citizens of poor countries for the citizenship of a richer country. Immigration
quotas are severely limited by rich countries, and citizenship can only legally be acquired in
practice by prolonged residence, marriage, birth in the territory, the possession of extremely
scarce skills, or through persecution in an appropriate rival state.  In other words, for the
citizens of a rich country their passport in itself represents a considerable economic asset. In
marked contrast, citizenship of a poor country can often be obtained officially and at low cost
by an immigrant from a rich country.
Specifically, the marginal product of her labour in the richer country can be obtained with a
work permit, while income from financial assets does not even require a residence permit.
None the less, passports are obviously valued more highly than work or resident permits. ThisQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 4
is because what distinguishes one economy from another in a world of mobile capital is not
only the stock of capital and labour skills but also the social infrastructure that is located there
as the result of the public investment of fiscal revenue in the past. and the skills and size of the
workforce that live there. A passport gives access to this infrastructure on a life-time basis, and
includes not only educational and social security benefits, but also full protection by the law,
voting rights and so on; in addition to the benefits of a work permit..  
Even a work permit has considerable economic value, because moving the same set of skills
from a poor to a rich economy raises the worker’s productivity and thus wage earnings
because her skills are used more effectively due to better economic organization and there is a
higher capital stock per worker. etc, this is clearly not the same thing as citizenship, which
gives right of abode for a lifetime and guarantees family access to education, health, social
security, police protection etc. Ownership of part of the capital stock in a particular country
does not in fact even require a residence permit, so the risk-adjusted rate of return is becoming
equalised worldwide. What is more, ownership rights are increasingly guaranteed worldwide
through international investment conventions. This is not the case for labour, which cannot
freely cross boundaries and which works under very different social regimes. In consequence,
similar skills receive vastly different rewards according to the citizenship of the worker - due to
both her location and her entitlement to a ‘dividend’ from installed social infrastructure. This
would be broadly equivalent to the concept of ‘social citizenship’ in political theory derived
from the rights and obligations in the welfare state as established in industrialized democracies
after the Second World War: “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society” (Marshall, 1950: 11).
This issue does not appear to be directly addressed by the modern economic literature on
migration, which is derived from a Ricardian model of trade between two countries with
mobile labour and two sectors. The traditional result is that pure labour movements (ie without
capital or skills) increase (lower) the wage rate of the labour-exporting (labour importing)
country. Trade liberalization leads to a rise (fall) of wages in the labour-exporting (-importing)
country and thus reduces migration. The introduction of risk and asymmetric information intoQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 5
this specification makes this formulation more realistic (Stark, 1991), but can generate the
result that trade liberalization will actually increase migration (Fiani, 1996). None the less, 
marginal labour productivity changes and thus wage differentials are still the key driving force
in the process. 
Gatsios et al. (1996) introduce a public good this standard model of trade and migration. into
their model; migration affects not only wages due to changes in the labour supply; and changes
in the unit net cost of producing the public good. They show that in a labour exporting (labour
importing) country, where international migration induces a decrease (increase) in net income
tax revenue, the provision of the public good falls (rises) if the unit cost of its production
decreases. In the presence of a public good financed by income taxation, however, international
migration affects wages also through its impact on the provision of the public good. 
International migration may lower wages in the source country and raise them in the
destination country, regardless of whether it induces an increase or a decrease in the unit cost
of the public good. Thus, in the presence of a public good, the existence of a wage differential
favouring the destination country, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for migration
to be an optimal policy. 
They find that under certain conditions international migration may lead to a conflict of
interests among workers, non-migrating workers, and the government of a labour-exporting
country.  Congestion in the consumption of public goods and services, as well as increasing
marginal costs, may outweigh the benefits of increased government tax revenue in the host
country:  “In several industrialised countries (e.g. Germany, France, the UK) anti-migration
sentiments unduly view immigrants as a source of poor economic performance (eg rising
unemployment and falling wages) and a fiscal burden since, as it is argued, immigrants raise the
cost of public goods provision by more than their tax contributions” (op. cit. p.15). 
In the endogenous growth literature, in contrast, a significant focus has been on the provision
of a ‘third’ growth factor other that ‘pure’ labour and capital - variously interpreted as
knowledge, institutions, infrastructure, social capital etc. To the extent that this ‘social
infrastructure’ is publicly provided and financed out of taxation, as well as probably enjoyingQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 6
scale economies, its accumulation will have a specific law of motion which will characterise the
growth process.   In traditional neoclassical growth models, where physical capital is the only
factor that can be accumulated, both capital and labour income taxes reduce the steady-sate
level of income but have only a transitory effect on the rate of growth - although the taxation
of labour (which affects the work-leisure choice) is superior to the taxation of capital, which
reduces the rate of return on savings. So low tax rates biassed towards wages appear to be
justified. However, once publicly provided human capital is included in the model, it would
appear that not only is quite high taxation justified in the short run to allow for the
accumulation of government assets, but also taxes should be levied on wealth (ie physical and
human capital) rather than incomes in order to minimise substitution effects (Milesi-Ferretti &
Roubini, 1996). 
Neither the trade-immigration or the endogenous growth literature appear to have integrated
the more recent reality of global capital market integration into their analysis. Nor do they
distinguish clearly between the role of labour as recipient of wages on the one hand, and the
citizen as holder of social entitlements on the other. The problem arises because if capital
receives a single return worldwide, and wages are equal to the marginal product of labour in
each country, incomes per capita should equalize once differences in skill composition are
accounted for. This is clearly not the case, basically because - as endogenous growth theory
tells us - because there is also a large difference in ‘social infrastructure’ endowment, which
explains a large part of international income differentials. 
We approach this issue by attempting to answer the following question:
in a world of fully mobile private capital, immobile homogeneous labour and social
infrastructure specific to a particular country, what is the economic value of the
passport to the citizens of that country?
 
In order to tackle this problem, we have constructed a simple partial-equilibrium endogenous
growth model in the tradition of Romer (1986) and Scott (1989), which will clearly identify the
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(1)
(2)
supplied from domestic savings and international capital markets (and which embodies any
technological progress), and social overhead capital (‘infrastructure’) which reflects the
endowment of productive factors which is collectively owned and specific to that particular
country - the ultimate ‘non-traded good’.
An Economy with Global Capital Market Access and Tax-financed Infrastructure 
Consider a world economy where there are three homogenous factors of production: capital
(K), labour (L) and ‘infrastructure’ (J). Capital is privately owned and perfectly mobile
internationally. Labour cannot move because it is restricted to national territories (i); and
infrastructure is socially owned and fixed once installed in any one country. Capital and labour
are rewarded according to their respective marginal products, while infrastructure is financed
by a tax at a fixed rate (z) wages and profits.
The notion we wish to explore is that the ‘value of the passport’ reflects the citizen’s claim on
that part of output (Y) that is strictly attributable to infrastructure (J) under the conditions
defined above. This requires that first we set up a model of how such an economy works. In
order to analyse this definition, we set up a simple model for the ith country based on a familiar
production function with fixed production coefficients (a, b, g) and a country-specific constant
(A) reflecting total factor productivity:
From now on until the closing part of this section we will drop the country subscript.
We must now explain the behaviour of the four variables in [1]. First, we assume that general
productivity change not attributable to any one factor (that is ‘total factor productivity



















Capital is internationally mobile, and thus receives a single real rate of return (r*), determined
on the international capital market and independent of marginal changes in the capital stock of
any one economy. The domestic capital stock (K) adjusts (using domestic and foreign savings)
until the domestic rate of return - the marginal product of capital net of tax at rate (z)  - is
equal to the international rate:
Differentiating [1] with respect to capital (K) and substituting into [2] yields the capital-output
ratio which corresponds to the capital market equilibrium solution:
Note that a higher tax rate (z) to finance infrastructure provision will reduce the capital-output
ratio (reflecting the fiscal ‘crowding-out’ of private by public investment, so to speak), as will
an in crease in the international rate of return (r*).
The labour market is very simple as labour is internationally immobile and full employment is
assumed.  So labour supply (L) is determined by the rate of demographic expansion (n) of the
economically active population:
 
and the wage (after tax) is equal to the marginal product of labour in the usual way, found by
differentiating [1] with respect to L:





































Infrastructure (J) is provided by the government and funded by the corresponding tax rate (z). 
The ‘law of motion’ for infrastructure expansion is thus given by annual tax funding less the
depreciation at a given rate (d) of the existing infrastructure: 
The infrastructure tax rate (z) in this model is endogenous. The government sets this tax rate so
as achieve the balance between labour, capital and infrastructure that maximises aggregate
income (Y). This is achieved at the point where output is maximized with respect to the tax
rate: 
Differentiating [4] and [7] with respect to z and substituting into [8] yields an equilibrium
solution for the optimal balance between private capital and public infrastructure where:
This is in fact a maximum because the second-order condition:
is clearly met so long as 1>z>0.
We can now solve for the equilibrium tax rate (z). The ratio of infrastructure to output is
simply derived from [4] and [10]:
 x ’ a % $n
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In the ‘steady state’ (for a given international interest rate) the ratios of K and J to Y will in fact
be stable, because as we shall see the tax rate (z) is entirely a function of the parameters of the
model. The steady state rate of growth (x) is thus easily derived from [1] as:
For small values of  x, d, can derive from [7]
And finally substituting [11] into [13] we have a solution for the tax rate:
Note that for positive values of the coefficients, the tax rate lies within the logical range (0 < z
< 1). 
We now have a solutions for K, J, L, Y as well as for the equilibrium tax rate (z) and growth
rate (x). We can thus proceed to find the ‘passport value’
Passports, Work Permits and Free Migration
The ‘social dividend’ we shall define as the difference between per capita income net of capital
charges and tax on the one hand and the marginal product wage (net of tax) on the other. 
Note that migrant workers (ie. those without citizenship and thus the dividend) would just
receive the post-tax marginal product wage, while foreign investors would just get the post-tax
marginal return on capital. 
We thus define the current value (q) of the passport as the citizen’s ‘share’ of  the residual of
national income (Y) after the return to labour (w) and the return to capital (r):q ’ 1
L
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the capitalised value of which over the remaining life of the passport-holder (T) is clearly
Substituting [4] and [6] into [15] gives q in terms of per capita income (y=Y/L):
and then by substituting [14] into [17] finally yields a solution in per capita income, the growth
rate and the parameters:
with a capitalized value from [16] of
Clearly, for q > 0, the composite coefficient (2) in [18] must be less than unity:
This seems to be so for reasonable parameter values, and formally for small x, d it is clear that
this condition is met not only by the usual Cobb-Douglas condition that all three the
coefficients sum to unity, but by the less restrictive condition that " + $ < 1 and thus overall
scale economies are possible.
Note that if the three coefficients do sum to unity and x, d are nearly zero, then the passportq ’ (.y
qi & qj ’ yi(1 & 2i) & yj(1 & 2j)
pi,j ’ yi$i(1 & zi) & yj$j(1 & zj)




value reduces to the intuitively convincing value equivalent to the familiar labour and capital
shares of aggregate income derived from the Cobb- Douglas model:
Note also that an increase in the world interest rate (r*) will not affect the right hand terms in
[14], but by reducing the capital stock through [5] will actually reduce per capita income (y),
so the passport value will fall - and the capitalized value (Q) fall even more strongly!
We have established the value (q) of a passport in absolute terms. However presumably the
‘price’ that potential immigrants would be prepared to pay depends upon where they come
from and thus their ‘reserve price’. The demand for passports from country ‘i’ by citizens of
country ‘j’ depends upon the relative values q - q and thus not only on the per capita incomes ij
( y y) but also on any differences in the factor coefficients (a, b, g) from [18]: i, j
Of course, if the immigrant can sell her existing passport at qj, then she will be willing to
purchase the other at the full price qi; other wise the market will settle at the difference. It
should also be remembered that a passport in effect contains a work permit as well: these have
an annual value (p) to the migrant (who can always return home and thus has a reserve price)
equivalent to the difference between post-tax wages in the two countries as defined in [6]: 
So far, we have assumed that labour is immobile, and examined what immigrants are prepared
to pay for a passport. At what price would rich countries be prepared to offer one? One
approach would be to suggest that this should be done at the ‘Pareto price’ (g) defined as the
payment of a sum such that (suitably distributed) the per capita income of existing citizens
would not be reduced (Giersch, 1996). In terms of our model, as labour is homogeneous and
capital demands the same return worldwide, the Pareto price is the marginal social cost of an
extra immigrant.  g ’&* ( Y / L )
* L
L’(1 & $)y
g ’ (" % ()y > q
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(24)
(25)
By inspection, we can see that whether g> or < q depends on the exact parameter values. Of
course if g > q, there would be no market for passports. In the simple Cobb-Douglas case
illustrated in [21], then 
So there would be no demand at the Pareto price and it would act as an effective bar to further
immigration. 
Some empirical evidence
Our first approximation is derived from ‘benchmark’ data for the three production coefficients)
provided in the literature, plus the assumption that for a representative country total factor
productivity growth (a) is 1 percent per annum, labour force growth (n) is 2 percent per
annum, the social infrastructure depreciates at a rate of 2 percent per annum (that is, it lasts for
50 years) and the discount rate is 5 percent per annum.  Table 1 gives the results of the relevant
calculations carried out by imputing into our model solutions the parameter values listed above
and production coefficients determined empirically from econometric estimates by Barro &
Sali-i-Martin (1995) and  Mankiw & associates (1992) respectively, and a ‘Cobb-Douglas’
form with equal coefficients as a standard of comparison.
TABLE 1: BENCHMARK RESULTS FOR THE MODEL
alpha beta gamma x z q/y Q/y
Barro 0.30 0.20 0.50 0.070 0.048 0.524 10.5
Mankiw 0.31 0.41 0.28 0.044 0.064 0.326 6.5
Cobb-D 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.050 0.063 0.381 7.6
From what seem to be a reasonable range of parameter values for the production function, we
derive a range of optimal infrastructure tax rates of 4.8 to 6.4 percent; and an annual passportQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 14
value of 38 to 52 percent of annual per capital income. Are these results at all realistic? These
are, of course, optimal solutions - as is revealed by the high implicit growth rates (x)  which
assume that the government has set an optimal tax rate (z*) and there is unlimited access to
international capital flows so there is no savings constraint. None the less, the implicit tax rate
does not seem unrealistic and while the implication that between a third and a half of average
incomes derives from social overhead capital is itself no more than the result of attributing a
particular parameter value to its coefficient (gamma) in the production function. The
capitalized value of citizenship (Q) at six to ten times annual income may seem high, but it
should be remembered that the ratio of house prices to annual earnings used by mortgage
lenders is of the order of four to five times. 
In the real world of course, we can only observe the tax rates determined by multiple historical
and political-economy considerations and the growth rates actually achieved in practice. First,
Tables 2 and 3 display our estimates of the current values of the ‘infrastructure tax’ (z). Taxes
are not hypothecated for such a purpose of course, so we have estimated the proportion of
total government expenditure which can be attributed to the social infrastructure under two
definitions, and applied this to the total tax rate. In Table 2 , ‘Definition A’ includes
government expenditure on health, education, welfare, housing, transport and communications;
in Table 3 ‘Definition B’ includes the rather more restricted list of government expenditure on
education and health plus capital expenditure on welfare, housing, transport and
communications. 
The observed tax rates can then be compared with what the model would suggest they should
be on the basis of the ‘Barrow’ and ‘Mankiw’ estimates of the production coefficients on the
one hand, and the observed rates of growth on the other. It is evident from Tables 2 and 3 that
there is a considerable deviation between the observed and ‘expected’ tax rates, but the orders
of magnitude are very similar, which is reassuring. The divergence is due to both our very
crude definitions of the categories measured and the institutional factors determining social
expenditure. However, we have not yet been able to discern a pattern of divergence that might
be tested systematically. Initial statistical analysis reveal statistically insignificant correlations
between the various real and estimated values of  z . QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 15
Finally, Table 5 shows the resulting ‘passport values’ calculated in two ways: first, by using the
observed values of growth (x) and (z) applied to observed per capita income (y) for the Barro
and Minkiw parameter values respectively; and second, by using the ‘benchmark’ values for x
and z from Table 1 applied to the observed income levels, again with the two parameter sets. 
The resulting estimates for the value of different countries’ passports are of some interest: that
for the USA, for instance, appears to average around $100,000 between the four estimates;
while those for Argentina and Peru are $30,000 and $5,000 respectively.
Unfortunately there is little direct evidence of the market value of passports, for obvious
reasons. None the less
“Rich Chinese mostly from Hong Kong and Taiwan can buy genuine passports and
citizenship of Bolivia, Honduras, Argentina, Belize and other Central American
countries at $12, 000 to $35, 000.” (‘Citizenship for a price’ The Nation, Bangkok,
September 30, 1996).
Although this might be taken as a market valuation of citizenship in these countries, it is
evident from Table 4 that in economic terms a Taiwanese or Hong Kong passport is ‘worth’
more than a Latin American as such: clearly the acquisition of the latter is only the first step in
a long journey towards the real objective - “to enter ‘Golden Mountain’ (USA)” (loc. cit.).  QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 16
TABLE 2:     THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE TAX ‘Z’ - DEFINITION A
Govt  Social Total Govt Social
Total Infrastruct Exp / GNP Infrastruct




Canada 22.1 51.9 25.8 13.4
cd 2.96 5.4 2.3
j
France 40.7 68.6 45.5 31.2 12.69 5.9 2.7
Germany 31.6 63.5 33.6 21.3 6.73 6.9 3.4
Italy 41.8 65.3 53.4 34.8
i 14.54 7.2 3.7
Japan - - - - -7 . 33 . 4
Netherlands 50.7 68.3 53.9 36.8
cd 18.65 5.3 2.2
UK 36.2 51.9 38.2 19.8
ce 7.16 7.1 3.6
US 19.7 53.5 23.8 12.7
cd 2.50 6.7 3.2
Argentine 11.3 64.0 11.1 7.1
bc f i i 7.98 2.7 0.5
Brazil 26.6 43.9 25.6 11.2
ce 2.97 5.1 2.1
Chile 24.4 64.2 22.6 14.5 3.53 7.0 2.9
Colombia 20.3 40.3 19.9 8.1
bc i i 1.62 2.2 3.6
Mexico 13.9 25.0 17.8 4.4
bc g i i 0.61 1.0 2.6
Peru 10.8 - 14.0 - -1 . 01 . 9
Venezuela 18.0 - 19.2 - -3 . 10 . 5
Hong Kong - - - - - 11.1 6.0
Singapore 26.6 39.9 19.7 7.8
c 2.07 5.4 1.2
S. Korea 19.8 38.0 17.1 6.5
ch 1.28 16.2 9.8
Taiwan - - - - - 19.0 12.1
Data from World Development Report 1995. Data refer to 1993 unless otherwise indicated
Social Infrastructure includes government expenditure on health, education, welfare, housing and when
a 
available, transport and communications.  
Data from World Data Base 1991-1994, The World Bank ( 1990, 1992, 1989 respectively for the
b  
countries in question).
 includes transport and communications government expenditure
c
 1994    1992   1990    1989    1995
defgh
 data obtained from Government Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1995, IMF
i
 ‘z’ is obtained as the product of the social infrastructure ratio times the total revenue ratio
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TABLE 3:  THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE TAX ‘Z’ - DEFINITION B
  
Govt  Social Total Govt Social
Total Infrastruct Exp / GNP Infrastruct
Rev / ure* / ure* /
GNP Govt Exp GNP
z z BS zMRW
Canada 22.1 10.0 25.8 2.58
cd 0.57 5.4 2.3
j
France 40.7 23.1 45.5 10.51 4.27 5.9 2.7
Germany 31.6 17.6 33.6 5.91 1.86 6.9 3.4
Italy 41.8 29.6 53.4 15.8
i 6.60 7.2 3.7
Japan - - - - -7 . 33 . 4
Netherlands 50.7 26.8 53.9 14.44
cd 7.30 5.3 2.2
UK 36.2 19.4 38.2 7.41
ce 2.68 7.1 3.6
US 19.7 21.8 23.8 5.18
cd 1.02 6.7 3.2
Argentina 11.3 17.8 11.1 1.96
bc f i i 0.22 2.7 0.5
Brazil 26.6 13.9 25.6 3.55
ce 0.90 5.1 2.1
Chile 24.4 24.9 22.6 5.62 1.37 7.0 2.9
Colombia 20.3 30.9 19.9 6.14
bc i i 1.24 2.2 3.6
Mexico 13.9 15.6 17.8 2.77
bc g i i 0.38 1.0 2.6
Peru 10.8 - 14.0 - -1 . 01 . 9
Venezuela 18.0 - 19.2 - -3 . 10 . 5
Hong Kong - - - - - 11.1 6.0
Singapore 26.6 30.9 19.7 6.08
c 1.61 5.4 1.2
S. Korea 19.8 26.8 17.1 4.58
ch 0.90 16.2 9.8
Taiwan - - - - - 19.0 12.1
Data from World Development Report 1995. 
* social infrastructure as government expenditure on education; health; the capital expenditure share on
welfare; housing; and when available transport and communications (capital portion on government
expenditure from Government Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1995)
 Data refer to 1993 unless otherwise indicated
a 
Data from World Data Base 1991-1994, The World Bank ( 1990, 1992, 1989 respectively for the
b  
countries in question ).
 includes transport and communications government expenditure
c
 1994    1992   1990    1989    1995
defgh
 data obtained from Government Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1995, IMF
i
 ‘z’ is obtained as the product of the social infrastructure ratio times the total revenue ratio.
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TABLE 4: PASSPORT VALUES FROM THE MODEL
 Economic Values of Passports
q-unit Q
Benchmark Benchmark
BS MRW BS MRW BS MRW BS MRW
canada 0.407 0.305 0.52 0.33 81182 60985 103844 65901
france 0.424 0.292 0.52 0.33 95414 65601 116948 74217
germany 0.441 0.299 0.52 0.33 103989 70509 122512 77748
italy 0.455 0.299 0.52 0.33 90223 59386 103168 65472
japan 0.434 0.316 0.52 0.33 136706 99571 163748 103917
netherla 0.405 0.300 0.52 0.33 84769 62945 108940 69135
uk 0.448 0.300 0.52 0.33 80980 54161 93912 59598
us 0.435 0.300 0.52 0.33 107512 74124 128648 81642
argentin 0.339 0.414 0.52 0.33 26170 31968 40144 25476
brazil 0.403 0.297 0.52 0.33 11818 8705 15236 9669
chile 0.421 0.343 0.52 0.33 13361 10872 16484 10461
colombia 0.367 0.125 0.52 0.33 5136 1752 7280 4620
mexico 0.368 0.052 0.52 0.33 13273 1870 18772 11913
peru 0.291 0.033 0.52 0.33 4338 493 7748 4917
venezuel 0.350 0.509 0.52 0.33 9926 14463 14768 9372
HongKo 0.478 0.340 0.52 0.33 86410 61382 93912 59598
Singapor 0.401 0.526 0.52 0.33 79581 104420 103220 65505
S.Korea 0.521 0.367 0.52 0.33 39928 28109 39832 25278
Taiwan 0.545 0.380 0.52 0.33
Conclusions 
In this paper we have established from a simple partial equilibrium endogenous growth model that in a
world of fully mobile capital and fully immobile labour, per capita incomes do contain a substantial
element derived from the social infrastructure accumulated by an optimally-taxing government.
Therefore a passport (ie citizenship) can be considered as an economic asset with an annual value that
can be defined as the difference between national income net of capital charges, wage costs and taxes
and divided equally among the population. This value we have shown to depend on per capita income,
the rate of growth and the parameters of the production function. 
Our preliminary empirical estimates are necessarily very approximate, but do indicate that citizenship can
be an important component of the international dispersion of per capita income, independently of the
labour skills or capital endowment. A more definitive estimate would require considerable furtherQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 19
research based on more accurate data on factor endowments and a more complete definition of ‘human’
(ie skill) as opposed to ‘social’ capital as discussed in Wood (1994). 
Meanwhile, it does seem reasonable to conclude that one of the major inconsistencies inherent in the
emerging model of a global economy is the effective prohibition on international labour mobility which,
as we have shown, makes citizenship an economic endowment of unequal value. It could be argued, of
course, that the accumulated social capital in any one country is the result of the tax payments made by
previous generations of citizens, which are then ‘bequeathed’ to succeeding generations in that country.
In a sense this is clearly true. However, the canonical contractarian assessment for the economic justice
of a particular set of institutional arrangements involves a test based on the ‘veil of ignorance’ Rawls
(1972). In our case this would presumably be whether a rational person would be willing to be born into
(or have her children born into) the world irrespective of her citizenship. To the extent that the answer
would clearly negative - and this would not just be a question of cultural identity but rather of life
opportunities derives from social infrastructure entitlements - than the present international arrangements
can be rigorously defined as ‘unjust’ so long as the world can be conceived as a political community. 
Principles of justice are relevant here, even in liberal political theory, because international trade and
investment activities produce substantial common benefits - particularly to the industrialized countries
best able to take advantage of them - while  participation in the global economy is effectively non-
voluntary for poor countries in practice (Beitz, 1979).
United Nations resolutions, from Chapters IX and X of the Charter itself through to the 1986
Declaration of the Right to Development, also recognize the obligation of the international community to
deal with the international distribution of income directly; indeed under international public law “there is
probably also a collective duty of member states to take responsibility to create reasonable living
standards both for their own peoples and for those of other states” (Brownlie, 1990: 259).  This
obligation is of course one of the underpinnings of international development cooperation between states
(DAC, 1996), and can be seen as the basis of a potential global wealth tax (FitzGerald 1997). In effect, a
tax on accumulated social infrastructure in rich countries could be levied in order to fund to an
equivalent buildup in poor countries in default of a liberalization of the global labour market.  QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS04 Page 20
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